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Minnesota Inheritance Tax:
Some Problems and Solutions
The author analyzes the Minnesota inheritance tax provi-
sions applicable to four types of "transfers": insurance trans-
fers, powers of appointment, transfers taking effect at death
and annuities and employee death benefits. After construing
the relevant case law and comparing the applicable federal
estate tax provisions, he develops suggestions for legislative
reappraisal and revision of the Minnesota provisions.
David R. Brink*
THIS article will consist of two main phases. In the first it
will analyze Minnesota inheritance tax law pertaining to four com-
monly encountered types of death transfer of property. These four
types, hereinafter discussed separately, are Insurance, Powers of
Appointment, Transfers Taking Effect at Death, and Annuities and
Employee Death Benefits.
In each of these four tax situations, the governing section of the
inheritance tax statutes emphasizes that the tax is primarily one
imposed on a "transfer."' From this premise the Minnesota Supreme
Court has drawn a distinction between an estate tax levied upon the
transmission of property by a decedent and an inheritance tax levied
upon the succession to property by a transferee.2
Mere recognition of the basic concept that the inheritance tax is
a succession tax on transfers rather than an estate tax does not of
itself provide an answer to the question of taxability posed by a
given inheritance tax situation. In fact, a transfer consists of a
number of parts. There must be an act of transfer from a transferor
relating to a property interest and also an act of receipt of or succes-
* Member of the Minnesota Bar
1. "A tax ...is hereby imposed upon any transfer of property....rany
interest therein, . . . to any person. . . ." MN. STAT. § 291.01(1) (1957). The
transfers described are transfers of property subject to probate administration, trans-
fers in contemplation of death or intended to take effect at or after death. In subse-
quent subdivisions of § 291.01, power of appointment property, joint tenancy property
and life insurance are separately characterized as being the subjects of taxable
transfers. Annuities are usually deemed taxable, if at all, as transfers taking effect
at death.
2. Chase v. Commissioner of Taxation, 226 Minn. 521, 33 N.W.2d 706 (1948);
In re Estate of Rising, 186 Min. 56, 242 N.W. 459 (1932).
3. Witness the conflicts among the courts of different inheritance tax states over
the specific topics hereinafter discussed.
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sion to the transferred property by the transferee. Where one of
these parts is recognized as the sole criterion of taxability, the result
will be strikingly different from the result where another part is so
recognized.
In general, courts applying inheritance tax statutes have tended
either to emphasize the decedent's possession of interests in the
property transferred on the one hand, or the transferee's receipt of
the property on the other. In the former type of case, which is
referred to herein as an "ownership theory" case, property passing
to a transferee at the decedent's death will escape tax if the decedent
had no interest in it at his death.4 In the latter type of case, which
is herein called a "succession theory" case, property may be subject
to tax if received by a transferee at the decedent's death, even
though the decedent then had no interest in or control over the
property.5 A spectrum of positions intermediate to the two extremes
is possible depending upon the weight given to the particular factors
composing each of the main types of transfer.
In Minnesota, it has been suggested judicially that the inheritance
tax law imposes both a transfer tax (using that term as meaning a
tax on transmission of ownership of property from the decedent) and
a succession tax.' However, an analysis of the law pertaining to each
of the types of transfer herein discussed tends to reveal that Minne-
sota law has developed in the past along lines which can best be
characterized as embodying extreme succession theory. Under
each of the topics discussed below, the thesis is offered that a less
severe application of succession theory would be more in accord
with other state authorities, more fair and workable, and more in
harmony with federal law. There are signs, in the shape of an
important recent decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court,7 that a
turn to less severe applications of the succession theory is already
in the making in Minnesota.
Unfortunately, however, the process of lawmaking by decision
comes slowly and painfully in this field. Inheritance taxes on prop-
4. As examples of ownership theory, see People v. Northern Trust Co., 330 111. 238,
161 N.E. 525 (1928); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Maxwell, 221 N.C. 528, 20
S.E.2d 840 (1942); In re Heine's Estate, 100 N.E.2d 545 (Ohio P. Ct. 1950); c.
In re Estate of Marshall, 179 Minn. 233, 228 N.W. 920 (1930).
5. As examples of succession theory, see Estate of Madison, 26 Cal. 2d 453, 159
P.2d 630 (1945); Chase v. Commissioner of Taxation, 226 Minn. 521, 33 N.W.2d
706 (1948); In re Hollander, 123 N.J. Eq. 52, 195 Atl. 805 (Prer. 1938); cf.
DeCoster v. Commissioner of Taxation, 216 Minn. 1, 11 N.W.2d 489 (1943); In ro
Estate of Robinson, 192 Minn. 39, 255 N.W. 486 (1934).
6. In re Estate of Rising, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N.W. 459 (1932); State v. Brooks,
181 Minn. 262, 232 N.W. 331 (1930).
7. Blue Diamond Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 91 N.W.2d
595 (Minn. 1958).
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erty not subject to probate administration are determined admin-
istratively by the Commissioner in the first instance.8 The assess-
ment is usually not made until after final settlement of federal
estate tax liability- a process which in itself may take as much as
three years following the decedent's death. By this time the lawyer
usually finds that the estate representative, transferee, and family
members are clamoring for settlement of the estate. The State De-
partment of Taxation normally concedes little or nothing with re-
spect to arguable issues. A tax order, after frequently extended
negotiations, is drawn by the Department and served. In the typical
situation, it may impose a tax which is substantial in itself, but
appears minor to the client when compared with the federal estate
tax burden, the assured cost of further litigation, the necessity of
further delays, and the lack of certainty of final outcome. The
inheritance tax order is therefore not appealed from and thus die
unborn all but a handful of the legal actions which might otherwise
lead to more rapid development of our inheritance tax law.
Accordingly, if rapid movement and certainty in the inheritance
tax field are to be gained, we must seek them through legislation.
The 1959 session of the Minnesota Legislature offers an immediate
opportunity to extend in the inheritance tax field the substantial
revisions of state tax law following the pattern of federal models 10
which were made at the 1957 sessions.
Therefore, the second phase of this article, following the discussion
of each inheritance tax problem, will make brief suggestions for
curative legislation. Federal models are used to the fullest extent
possible, without abandoning the basic approach of the present
law. 1 The adoption of these suggestions will eliminate many injus-
8. MmiN. STAT. § 291.09 (1957). The writer understands that legislation is to be
introduced at the 1959 session of the legislature which would provide that the tax
on both probate and nonprobate transfers would be determined by the probate
court under judicial procedures. Such procedures are already in use in neighboring
states.
9. The federal estate tax return is likely to be filed or at least amended (under
the procedure now permitted by Treas. Reg. § 20.203'21(b)2 (1958)) after the
lapse of the year following the decedent's death in order to insure proper use of the
alternate valuation privilege. INcr. REv. CODE or 1954, § 2032. Present audit practice
of federal estate tax returns, in the writer's experience, is such that as much as
eighteen months may elapse between the filing of the return and a conference with
the examining agent. The presence of unagreed issues, even assuming no higher
administrative review or litigation is ultimately needed, will easily account for the
balance of the three year period.
10. Minn. Laws 1957, cbs. 301, 846, 932 (pertaining to income tax on decedents,
estates, trusts and beneficiaries) and other sections substantially enacted the provi-
sions of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, where applicable, in the income tax sphere.
11. Federal models for such radical proposals as substitution of an estate tax
(only) for an inheritance tax, elimination of the probate court-appointed appraiser
system of valuing assets, and institution of a marital deduction have been ignored.
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tices, pitfalls and inconsistencies between state and federal rules
which now bedevil estate planners and practitioners and outrage
clients.' 2
I. INHE=IANCE TAX ON INSURANCE
The succession theory has been given free rein to date in taxing
the proceeds of insurance on the life of Minnesota decedents. Sub-
ject to the usual personal exemptions 13 and to certain insurance
exemptions,' 4 our inheritance tax statute15 purports to tax the full
proceeds of
all life or accident . . . policies taken out by decedent and payable on
account of his death, receivable by named beneficiaries . . . as follows:
(a) The proceeds of all such policies hereafter issued "I payable to named
beneficiaries. (b) The proceeds of all such policies now in force 17 pay-
able to named beneficiaries in which the insured has the right to change
the beneficiary or under which he has cash surrender right.
As to policies issued after 1949, at any rate, this statute appears
broad enough to subject to inheritance tax not only the proceeds of
insurance on the decedent's life where he possesses the incidents of
ownership and pays the premiums, but also "key man insurance"
on which a corporation pays the premiums and in which it owns all
rights or insurance owned and paid for by the widow, if it can be
assumed in each case that the insurance was "taken out by dece-
dent." 18 The latter type of insurance would not be subject to federal
estate tax in the decedent's estate. 9
12. One instance constituting a precedent of successful Minnesota legislation
along federal lines is the transfer in contemplation of death. The statute hero, MINN.
STAT. § 291.01(3) (1957), was harmonized with the latest federal rule in 1955. This
statute appears to work well and hence needs no comment in this Article. Two changes
in tax laws other than inheritance tax laws which should be made to conform to
federal statutes and eliminate traps for the unwary are: (1) authorize the annual
exclusion for gifts in approved form to minors per INT. REv. CoDE oFr 1954, §
2503(c), and (2) make the last date for filing a decedent's final individual Income
tax return the fifteenth day of the fourth month after the close of his normal taxablo
year (April 15 in case of decedents filing on the calendar year basis) as under
federal law instead of the fifteenth day of the fourth month following the month in
which the decedent died as now required by Minn. Income Tax Reg. § 2042(1 )a(4)
(1957).
13. MINN. STAT. §§ 291.05(5)-(10) (1957).
14. MINN. STAT. § 291.05(4) (1957).
15. Mis. STAT. § 291.01(5) (1957).
16. That is, as to decedents dying under the statute currently in force, issued after
April 25, 1949, the date of enactment of Minn. Laws 1949, ch. 735. Blue Diamond
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 91 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1958).
17. That is, in force on April 26, 1949. Blue Diamond Poultry Farms, Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra note 16. See MINN. STAT. § 645.02 (1957) as to effective date
of the 1949 statute.
18. The meaning properly to be ascribed to this phrase is hereinafter discussed at
some length. See text discussion at notes 32-41 infra.
19. INT. REv. CODE; OF 1954, § 2042.
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In the absence of a statute specifically taxing insurance payable to
named beneficiaries, courts of other states have usually held that
the insurance proceeds are received by the beneficiary by virtue of
the contract of insurance and not by virtue of the decedents death;
death is simply the event giving rise to maturity of the contract
rights.20 In fact, even in states where a statute expressly imposes a
death duty on the proceeds of insurance payable to named bene-
ficiaries, it has usually been held that the tax does not apply where
the decedent possessed no rights in the policies."' Thus the prevailing
view has been to adopt the ownership theory when taxing life insur-
ance proceeds, limiting taxability to situations in which the decedent
possessed interests in the policy at his death. Whether the Minne-
sota courts will now hold this section subject to similar limitations
remains open to some interesting but, unfortunately, not entirely
conclusive speculation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in 1943 reviewed the immediate
predecessor of the present statute taxing insurance in DeCoster v.
Commissioner of Taxation.22 In DeCoster, insurance had been issued
upon the life of the decedent in 1936, naming him as beneficiary
and granting him all rights of ownership. In 1938, the decedent
assigned all rights in the policy to his wife, filing a Minnesota gift
tax return for that year in which he reported the transfer of the
cash surrender value at the time of transfer. The one premium
falling due after the assignment was paid by the decedent, who died
in 1989. The Supreme Court held the proceeds of the insurance
subject to inheritance tax at the decedents death. The statute taxing
insurance,s which was effective July 15, 1937, like the present statute
provided for taxation of all "policies now [1937] in force payable to
named beneficiaries in which the insured has the right to change the
beneficiary or under which he has cash surrender right." After
finding the statute constitutional as against the contention that its
subject was not expressed in its title, the court held that the proceeds
were taxable because on the effective date of the statute the dece-
dent possessed the rights to change the beneficiary and to surrender
20. Tyler v. Treasurer, 226 Mass. 306, 115 N.E. 00 (1917); see In re Knoedler,
140 N.Y. 377, 35 N.E. 601 (1893); In re Voorhee's Estate, 200 App. Div. 259, 193
N.Y. Supp. 168 (1922); In re Haldrich's Estate, 134 Misc. 751, 236 N.Y. Supp. 395
(1929); Barkley v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 191 S.C. 147, 3 S.E.2d 809 (1939);
In re Killien's Estate, 178 Wash. 35, 35 P.2d 11 (1934); cf. In re Estate of Mar-
shall, 179 Minn. 233, 228 N.W. 920 (1930).
21. Martin v. Storrs, 277 Ky. 199, 126 S.W.2d 445 (1939); Wachovia Bank v.
Maxwell, 221 N.C. 528, 20 S.E.2d 840 (1942); Werthan v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 611,
51 S.W.2d 840 (1932). The Werthan case suggests that payment of premiums or
possession of the policies by the insured might be factors having some significance.
22. 216 Minn. 1, 11 N.W.2d 489 (1943).
23. Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1937, ch. 50 (now as amended MwrN. STAT. § 291.01(5)
(1957)).
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the policy for cash. In so holding, the court dismissed, as of little
help, cases where corporations were irrevocable beneficiaries of the
insurance, and distinguished Wachovia Bank v. Maxwell,"4 where
the incidents of ownership were in the decedent's wife from the
inception of the policy.2 5
Reduced to its essentials, the DeCoster case held that insurance
payable to named beneficiaries is taxable at the death of an insured
who once owned the policy, even though he has parted with all
incidents of ownership in it prior to his death. This is one of several
examples in Minnesota inheritance tax laws and decisions of the
application of extreme succession theory. All emphasis is placed
upon receipt of property (insurance proceeds) by the alleged trans-
feree at the transferor's death. No emphasis is placed upon the
possession of property rights (incidents of ownership in the policy)
by the insured at death. Without doubt, a shifting of economic bene-
fits, the key to inheritance taxation,26 has occurred, but when? Under
the more common ownership theory noted above, the "transfer"
consists of the assignment of the rights with death thereafter marking
only maturity of the contract assigned. Under the succession theory
apparently the insured's death marks the shift of economic benefits,
notwithstanding the intervening assignment. The shift of benefits
appears to occur from the owner of the policy at the insured's death
rather than from the insured who no longer possesses anything
capable of being transferred. Even if succession theory is adopted
as fundamentally correct, there would seem some logical objection
in that, regarded as of the date of death, the transfer could hardly
be one from the insured, since he had parted with his interest at
some previous time.
Whatever its purely legal merits may be, this application of succes-
sion theory can be questioned as a matter of fairness. A decedent
may leave a will making the customary direction to pay all estate
and inheritance taxes from his estate. Under DeCoster, his estate, at
least in the first instance, would pay tax on insurance on his life in
which he had no interest at death -a tax perhaps computed at the
high rates and low exemption allowed a stranger. To be sure, if
another type of tax payment clause is used, the burden of the tax
can clearly be shifted to the actual recipient of the proceeds. On the
other hand, is it fair that this insurance should be taxed even to the
recipient? The recipient under the DeCoster rule may well have
24. 221 N.C. 528, 20 S.E.2d 840 (1942).
25. The court notes that, notwithstanding the ownership of the policy by the
beneficiary in the Wachovia Bank case, the premiums were paid by the insured.
26. See In re McGrath's Estate, 191 Wash. 496, 71 P.2d 395 (1937), cert. denied,
Washington v. McGrath, 303 U.S. 651 (1938); cf. In re Bradley's Estate, 241 Minn.
394, 63 N.W. 2d 374 (1954); State v. Brooks, 181 Minn. 262, 270, 232 N.W. 331,
334 (1930).
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paid value for the policy by paying the premiums as reckoned by
actuarially computed premium tables assessing the risk. If so, why
should his investment be treated differently from any other invest-
ment in a contract or other property? If he receives a death benefit,
it is by payment of the normal premium price. Nor is there any
benefit to the decedent, his estate, or any beneficiary designated by
him. Everything here smacks of purchase and not of inheritance.
However, there are signs that the severe succession theory evi-
denced by the DeCoster case will be modified in the future. After
DeCoster, the Minnesota Supreme Court had no further opportunity
to consider the taxability of insurance in which the decedent had no
incidents of ownership until Blue Diamond Poultry Farms, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Taxation."T In Blue Diamond, at the death of the
decedent, a corporation received the proceeds of three policies on
his life. All three policies, by initial procurement or by subsequent
assignment, were owned by the corporation and it paid all of the
premiums. However, one policy was procured with the corporation
as original owner, one was procured with the decedent as original
owner and the corporation as beneficiary, and one was procured
with the decedent as original owner and the decedent's wife as
original beneficiary. The corporation's ownership of all three policies
was complete in 1947. The decedent died in 1951. Upon certiorari
from the Board of Tax Appeals, the Supreme Court reversed the
Board's imposition of an inheritance tax on these proceeds. Three
interesting situations were presented by the three policies here.
However, the court had no occasion to deal with the question of
taxability of insurance not owned by the insured at his death
because it held in effect that a 1949 amendment of the law 2 consti-
tuted a new law dealing with the taxation of insurance and therefore
that the references in the statute, as so amended, to "hereinafter
issued" and "now in force" referred to the effective date of the
amendment (April 26, 1949) rather than to the effective date of the
original law (July 15, 1937).-*
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the Blue Diamond case is
the siren suggestion at least twice made in the opinion that the
soundness of the DeCoster decision might be reconsidered when the
issues again were raised in a proper case.30 Assuming that such a
27. 91 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1958).
28. ibid.
29. Prior to Blue Diamond, the Commissioner insisted and many taxpayers as-
sumed that the internal references in the present statute continued to relate to July
15, 1937. Therefore, it may be supposed that some claims to refund of inheritance
tax will exist in cases where tax has been paid on insurance assigned by the insured
or procured by others prior to April 26, 1949, where the decedent's death followed
that date and where the right to seek the refund has not been lost by lapse of time.
30. 91 N.W.2d at 597, 598.
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case arises, what conclusions might the court reach when reconsid-
ering the issues presented in the DeCoster case?
One possibility would be that the court would hold tmconstitu-
tional the application of the statute to policies existing at its effective
date prior to the decedent's death. However, in other states this
argument has been rejected. The courts take the view, for constitu-
tional purposes at least, that nothing vests in the beneficiary until
the insured's death. Therefore no rights are impaired by the passage
of a statute taxing insurance prior to such death.3"
Another set of possibilities, if DeCoster is to be over-turned, arises
from the failure of that decision to discuss the meaning of the re-
quirement in the statute that the insurance be "taken out by dece-
dent." Of course, if "taken out by decedent" simply means that the
decedent's signature appears on the application for the insurance,
then the insurance in DeCoster was clearly "taken out" by the
decedent.32 However, in distinguishing the Wachovia Bank case, the
court in DeCoster apparently recognized that the mere form of the
application and the fact that it was signed by the decedent should
not result in taxability.33 It seems quite clear that making the form
of the application or its signature the criterion of taxability would
be technical in the extreme. The tax could easily be avoided by
insured persons or insurance companies under such a test simply by
omitting the requirement of the insured's signature on the applica-
tion form. No authority for such a rule has been found in state deci-
sions. "Taken out by decedent" evidently means something other
than the form of signature of the application. Therefore, the DeCos-
ter case will not need to be overruled in this respect.
The words "taken out by decedent" were undoubtedly adopted
by our legislature from federal law 3 and other state laws. The words
as used in the federal statute had a long history of varying admin-
istrative and judicial interpretations generally to the effect that the
decedent must have possessed one or more "incidents of ownership"
31. Dumesnil v. Reeves, 283 Ky. 563, 142 S.W.2d 132 (1940); State v. Cain, 102
Tenn. 213, 36 S.W.2d 82 (1931); In re Allis' Will, 174 Wis. 527, 184 N.W. 381
(1921). No case has been found analyzing carefully the question whether this argu-
ment should apply equally to insurance which has been assigned to the beneficiary;
of. State v. Brooks, 181 Minn. 262, 232 N.W. 331 (1930).
32. The writer's personal experience is that in administrative practice the Depart-
ment of Taxation does contend that signature of the application by the insured is
tantamount to the policy's being taken out by the insured.
33. 216 Minn. at 6, 11 N.W.2d at 491.
34. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 402, 42 Stat. 278, which was held constitu-
tional in Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929), read in part as
follows: "That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time of his death of all property ...tangible or intan-
gible ... (f) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent of the
excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
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or that he must have paid premiums or that both must have occurred
together 3 5 In its discussion of the Wachovia Bank case the court in
DeCoster also apparently dismissed the payment of premiums by the
insured as being one of the indicia of tax. The payment of premiums
has not been found as an established criterion of taxation in the
other states and is evidently not the meaning of "taken out by
decedent" in Minnesota.
The Board of Tax Appeals in 1948 in Pearson v. Commissioner of
Taxation," made a very creditable effort to define "taken out by
decedent" affirmatively in such a way as to be meaningful and to
be consistent with the DeCoster case. The facts of the Pearson case
were essentially the same as the DeCoster ease-a decedent had
assigned insurance to his wife after 1937 and prior to his death. In
Pearson, however, the widow vent on to pay the premiums. The
Board held the proceeds of the insurance subject to tax but only
insofar as the proceeds exceeded the premiums paid by the widowY
The Board drew upon principles which remained largely implicit
in the DeCoster decision in attempting to define "taken out by
decedent." Somewhat freely paraphrased, the Board said that neither
the mere signature of the application nor the payment of premiums
by the insured constituted taking out insurance; that insurance once
owned by the decedent and assigned (as in DeCoster and Pearson)
was taken out by decedent notwithstanding its subsequent assign-
ment and hence would be subject to tax, whereas insurance owned
at all times by the beneficiary could not have been taken out by the
decedent and hence would not be subject to tax." Thus, absence of
the incidents of ownership will prevent taxation, but only in the
situation where the insured has never possessed them. This may be
called a "limited incidents of ownership test." The Board recognized
the somewhat anomalous character of a rule which would impose a
tax in one ownership situation (policy once owned by insured and
assigned to beneficiary) and forego it in a situation having identical
economic and legal incidents as of the time of the decedent's death
(policy owned by beneficiary at all times). It stated, however, that if
a remedy were needed for this rule, in the light of the DeCoster
decision, that remedy must be for the legislature.
If the Pearson case correctly stated the law, then an insurance
35. Some of this history is well summarized in Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d
103 (8th Cir. 1936), and later in Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866
(D.C. Conn. 1945). The present provision, of course, requires for taxability that the
decedent must possess incidents of ownership at his death, eliminating the payment
of premiums test. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
86. 1 P-H INa. & TRIANS. T~x SErv. Minn. § 1008 (1949).
37. Allowance of the credit for premiums paid apparently represented some
recognition that the assignment of the policy may represent in whole or in part the
purchase of an investment rather than an inheritance.
38. 1 P-H, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1037.
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policy like the one in Blue Diamond, which was owned by the
corporate beneficiary from its very issuance but was issued after
1949, would escape tax and the other types of policies in Blue
Diamond, if issued after 1949, would not. This result, if it were what
the Supreme Court had in mind in the Blue Diamond opinion, could
also be obtained without overruling the DeCoster decision.
It appears that what the Supreme Court in the Blue Diamond case
is offering to reconsider is the time for determination of whether the
insured has the right to change the beneficiary or to surrender for
cash. The tax is imposed on "proceeds of all such policies now
[When?-Time Number One] in force payable to named bene-
ficiaries in which the insured has [When?-Time Number Two]
the right to change the beneficiary or under which he has [When?
- Time Number Two] cash surrender right."3" The DeCoster case
held that the "now" of the statute -identified as Time Number One
above-meant July 15, 1937 (or, to put it in terms of the present
statute, April 26, 1949). It also held in effect, without any discussion
of the question, that the "has" of the statute -identified in each
case as Time Number Two above- also referred to July 15, 1937.
On this narrow question it appears that DeCoster correctly
defined Time Number One, but that the most reasonable identifica-
tion of Time Number Two is at the death of the decedent.
Under such an interpretation policies in existence at the effective
date of the statute may be assigned by the insured prior to his death
and the tax levied at his death thereby avoided.40 This result was
suggested by the court in Blue Diamond where, in analyzing the
DeCoster case, it stated that:
The question thus presented was whether subsection (b) [section
291.01(5) (1) (b)] became applicable on the date of the enactmont or
whether it was to apply up to the date of the insured's death. We accepted
the former view and upheld the assessment. 41
The construction suggested, namely, that the possession of cash
surrender right or right to change beneficiaries must be determined
at the decedent's death appears reasonable. The statute imposes an
inheritance tax at death on insurance proceeds "payable on account
of death" on policies which (then) are payable to named bene-
ficiaries. Item (b) of the statute 42 was apparently intended to afford
relief against the application of the more extreme provisions of
item (a) to all policies in existence at the effective date of the
statute. If the time for determination of the taxable status of the
39. MINN. STAT. §§ 291.01(5)(1)(b) (1957). (Emphasis added.)
40. Probably always subject to the requirement that the transfer not bo one in
contemplation of death.
41. 91 N.W.2d at 597.
42. MNN. STAT. § 291.01(5)(1)(b) (1957).
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policies were the effective date of the statute, as held in DeCoster,
little relief would be afforded by this intended relief measure,
because only policies in which the insured at the effective date of
the statute happened not to possess the specified rights would be
protected from tax. No subsequent change by the insured in any
policy in which he possessed such rights, short of cancellation of
the policy (or perhaps making it payable to charity) could then
ever divest the policy of its taxable incidents. However, if the in-
sured's rights are to be viewed as of the time of his death, item (b)
becomes a real relief measure. The insured is then given his remain-
ing lifetime (subject possibly to the requirement that the transfer
not be in contemplation of death) to divest himself of the othervise
taxable rights to change the beneficiary or surrender for cash.
If it should be held under facts like those in DeCoster, that poli-
cies in existence on April 26, 1949 may thereafter be assigned and the
tax thereby avoided, what of policies not issued until after April 26,
1949? The Blue Diamond case does not offer any definite answer to
that question. However, the opinion contains the following state-
ment:
Had he [the insured] not relinquished these rights before that time [April
26, 1949] but had done so thereafter, then we would have before us
exactly the same situation which the DeCoster case presented and we
would be required to uphold the tax- assuming, of course, that we would
adhere to that decision. 43
This statement, taken literally, fails to accord any special treatment
to different policies depending on the circumstances of procurement
and ownership. In particular, no special treatment is given the policy
which was procured and owned by the Blue Diamond Company
from its inception. It is difficult to believe that such a policy in any
sense could be deemed "taken out by decedent." Moreover, even the
DeCoster case itself seemingly doubted taxability in this situation."
However, it seems that no significance should be attached to this
parity of treatment of the three policies by the court in the Blue
Diamond case; presumably all three were assumed for purposes of
the statement to have been owned by the decedent before 1949 and
transferred thereafter.
We are therefore left without precise cues indicating the direc-
tion of future case law relating to post-1949 policies. However, the
writer is willing to speculate that future decisions will follow along
lines already suggested by the court in the DeCoster case and ampli-
48. 91 N.W.2d at 598.
44. "Insofar as these cases concern insurance policies procured and paid for by
business firns or corporations wherein they are payees or irrevocable beneficiaries
we receive little help in this proceeding. The person whose life is insured in such
policies has no direct interest in the policy." 216 Minn. at 5, 11 N.W.2d at 491.
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fled by the Board of Tax Appeals in the Pearson case. All policies
on a decedents life payable to named benefilciaries to be taxable
must be "taken out by decedent," whether issued prior or subsequent
to 1949. The phrase does not mean that taxability depends on the
form of the application or whether the insured signed the form 45 nor
does it mean that taxability depends on whether or not the decedent
paid premiums-both DeCoster and Pearson give fairly precise
negative answers to that question. Where insurance is procured and
wholly owned at all times by the beneficiary and the insured does
nothing but submit to the physical examination, answer questions,
and provide the measuring life, the courts have generally refused to
impose the tax.46 The court in DeCoster in distinguishing Wachovia
Bank seemingly agrees with this result. Hence some type of "inci-
dents of ownership test" appears best to state the law in this
situation.
If "taken out by decedent" were held to mean precisely the limited
incidents of ownership test which the Board in Pearson had to
evolve to fit DeCoster, the result as to post-1949 policies would be
that, while policies never owned by the insured would escape tax,
policies owned by the insured at any time (even though later as-
signed) would be subject to tax. Such policies would then constitute
a strange class of property which, once acquired, could never be
disposed of by the owner (except, as noted, by abandonment or
transfer to charity) for purposes of Minnesota inheritance tax. This
result would also ignore the judicial interpretations of "taken out
by decedent" developed in the parent federal tax law. In applying
the incidents of ownership test, the federal authorities have looked
not to the incidents possessed by the insured at the inception of
the policy, but to the incidents possessed by him at death.47 Now
that the Blue Diamond case has reopened the question of time for
determination of the presence or absence of indicia of taxability, a
true incidents of ownership test rather than the limited one which
was evolved in Pearson can be stated judicially. As in the case of
pre-1949 transfers, the required incidents in post-1949 policies should
be examined as of the date of death. This result is reached on a broad-
er ground than that suggested above as the basis for overruling De-
Coster in pre-1949 cases. This ground, applicable not only to pre-
1949 policies under item (1) (b) of section 291.01(5), but also to
post-1949 policies under item (1) (a), is that policies are not "taken
out by decedent" if at his death he possessed no incidents of owner-
45. See text discussion at notes 32-41 supra.
46. See notes 20 & 21 supra.
47. Industrial Trust Co. v. United States, 296 U.S. 220 (1935); Bingham v.
United States, 296 U.S. 211 (1935); Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d 103 (8th Cir.
1936).
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ship. This will amount to an affirmation of something alin to the
ownership theory which has been the prevalent view in other states.
If such a true incidents of ownership test is held to govern, the
Minnesota law applicable to insurance on persons dying currently
can be summarized as follows:
(1) In the case of policies issued on or before April 26, 1949
(a) if the decedent died possessed of the right to obtain the cash
surrender value or to change the beneficiary, the proceeds will be
taxable; or
(b) if the decedent did not possess either of these specified rights at his
death, then (even though he might retain other incidents of owner-
ship) the proceeds will escape tax.
(2) In the case of policies issued after April 25, 1949
(a) if the decedent died possessed of any one or more of the numerous
possible incidents of ownership (e.g., not only the right to sur-
render or change beneficiaries, but such other rights as the rights
to convert the form of the policy, make loans against the policy,
receive the reversion, elect form of settlement, or change terms of
any governing insurance trust 48), the proceeds will be taxable;
or
(b) if (either because of original procurement of the policy by the
beneficiary or assignment of an existing policy to him) the dece-
dent did not possess any incident of ownership in the policy at
his death, the proceeds will escape tax.49
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the only distinction betveen
policies issued prior to 1949 and those issued subsequent thereto is
that the taxability of prior policies depends on the presence or
absence of two specified incidents of ownership whereas tax is
imposed on any post-1949 policy in which the decedent retains any
incident of ownership of any kind. The entire analysis proceeds from
three premises - (1) that every policy to be taxed must be "taken
out by decedent"; (2) that the statute governing pre-1949 policies
requires just the two selected incidents of ownership as the touch-
stones of taxability; and (3) that the criteria of taxability are to be
determined as of the date of death. Having arrived at this result, we
can only conclude, as did the Board in the Pearson case, that if any
change is desired in this rule, it should be made through legislation.
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis and the hints of things to
come contained in the Blue Diamond opinion, at present the De-
Coster case stands unrevoked as an example of extreme succession
theory. Before DeCoster can be undone and the insurance problems
all laid to rest, a number of cases presenting different fact situations
48. Some of the usual incidents can be found in the regulations to the Federal
Estate Tax sections of the Internal Revenue Code. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1
(1958). Reference may also be had to regulations under earlier federal laws.
49. The foregoing summary ignores the possible effect of transfers of incidents
of ownership by the insured in contemplation of death.
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will have to come before the court. To get to court, such cases will
have to survive the usual factors, hereinabove noted, militating
against litigation and appeal. The results of such cases are not
certain. Even if they follow the analysis herein offered of Minnesota
law, the results will be somewhat out of harmony with results in
other states (a somewhat unimportant circumstance) and in the
federal jurisdictions (this factor is important- it causes conflicts of
rules in the case of every Minnesota decedent who leaves an estate
subject to federal taxation). With the increased purchase of business
and key man insurance and with the greater volume of assignments
of policies which has undoubtedly occurred since the abandonment
of the payment of premiums test on the federal level, increased
certainty, fairness and simplicity of the governing rules of Minnesota
inheritance tax law are urgently needed.
Certainty, fairness and comparative simplicity in our inheritance
tax law on insurance can be achieved quickly through legislation
adopted at the 1959 session. Such legislation should provide for a
tax on proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life payable to named
beneficiaries with respect to which the decedent possessed at his
death any of the incidents of ownership. In detail, the revised item
(1) of section 291.01(5) with a few minor changes, could follow the
text of section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Such
legislation, clearly adopting only an "incidents of ownership" test,
would abolish the comparatively unimportant distinction which
now exists (if the foregoing analysis is correct) between policies
issued before and after 1949 and would preserve the essence of
existing law. Such legislation should be held constitutional as applied
to existing as well as future policies. , ' It would make immediately
available for state use a large body of interpretative cases, regula-
tions and rulings under federal and corresponding state law. It
should destroy the annoying differences which exist between federal
and Minnesota law, affecting both estate planning and estate
practice. No important revenues would be lost through the adoption
of such legislation."' Accordingly, legislation further harmonizing
state and federal tax laws is strongly recommended for adoption by
the legislature in 1959.
II. INE=rANcE TAx ON POwERs OF APPOINTrMENT
Another example of the succession theory of inheritance taxation
can be found in the Minnesota law governing the tax on the transfer
50. See note 21 supra.
51. In fact, if the analysis is correct, revenues would be gained in cases Involving
pre-1949 policies where the cash surrender and beneficiary change rights have been
relinquished by a decedent who, however, retains some other incident of ownership.
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of property subject to a power of appointment. Before considering
the effect of the Minnesota statute attention should be given briefly
to the inheritance taxation of powers in the absence of express
statute.
According to the common law property rule, property subject to a
power of appointment is transferred from the donor of the power
(not the donee) to the appointee or taker in default of appointment,
the donee of the power being at most the agency whereby the trans-
fer is accomplished.52 Under the ownership theory this property rule
is followed and, therefore, a death transfer tax is imposed on the
transfer from the donor to the ultimate recipient of the property
at the death of the donor.5 In states imposing an inheritance tax,
but having no special provision relating to powers of appointment,
the ownership theory of taxing powers has been followed. 4
By contrast, the Minnesota inheritance tax statute on powers 11
expressly taxes powers as transfers from the donee to the transferee.
Powers are taxed either at their exercise or lapse as though the
property subject to the power had passed to the appointees or the
takers-in-default by will of the donee exercising the power or failing
to exercise it, as the case may be. Despite the fact that this statute,
taken from the former New York law, 8 has been in force in sub-
stance at one time or another in more states 57 than any other type of
inheritance tax statute dealing with powers, many troublesome
problems which can arise remain unsettled.
A most serious problem involves the possibility of a double tax
on the transfer to the recipients of property subject to a power. The
Minnesota statute clearly imposes a tax on the transfers to the
actual recipients of the property at the death of the donee of a
testamentary power, whether the power is exercised or is not
52. State v. United States Trust Co., 99 Kan. 841, 163 Pac. 156 (1917); Shattuck
v. Burrage, 229 Mass. 448, 118 N.E. 889 (1918); Matter of Harbeck, 161 N.Y. 211,
55 N.E. 850 (1900).
53. Iighfield v. Delaware Trust Co., 84 Del 290, 152 AtL 117 (Super. Ct. 1929),
aff'd, 34 Del. 306, 152 AtL 124 (1930); State v. United States Trust Co., supra note
52; Matter of Harbeck, supra note 52; Morris' Estate, 42 D. & C. 522 (Orphan's Ct.
1941); see Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942); United States
y. Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921).
54. Such states apparently include Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, and Wyoming. See
4 P-H INm & T&NAs. TAX SEtv. Ind., La., Me., Wyo. 116. In Connecticut, where a
statute like Minnesota's, taxing powers was repealed (Conn. Pub. Acts 1929, ch.
729), the intent was said to be to abolish the tax on powers altogether. 1 CCH Lxm.,
EsT. & G--r TAx Map. 9 1540.01.
55. Mm. STAT. § 291.01(3) (1957).
56. See State v. Brooks, 181 Minn. 262, 232 N.V. 331 (1930).
57. At least a dozen other states have provisions substantially like Minnesota's. At
least five previously had similar statutes but have now changed them. See in this
connection 1 P-H InLn & TRNas. TAx SEmvicm 9 116.
58. In re Estate of Robinson, 192 Minn. 89, 255 N.V. 486 (1934).
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exercised.59 Does it also impose the tax at the death of the donor of
the power on the theory that the property subject thereto is trans-
ferred "by will ... from any person dying possessed of the prop-
erty while a resident of the state . .." 10 or transferred in any of the
other ways in which the property might be passed subject to tax at
the death of a decedent?
A reasonable answer appears to be that the legislature intended,
for purposes of the inheritance tax, to abrogate the common law rule
and to make a transfer of property subject to a power occur only at
the death of the donee. Apparently in this instance a shift from
ownership theory to succession theory was clearly intended by the
legislature. Under simple succession theory, the ultimate transferee
would achieve possession or enjoyment of the property by a transfer
(exercise or lapse of the power) of the donee of the power. Likewise,
under this statute the property subject to the power would escape
tax at the donor's death and would encounter it only at the death of
the donee from or through whom the property was received."' This
normal succession theory result has been obtained under similar
statutes in those cases outside Minnesota which have considered the
question directly. 2 These cases all held the property passing under
the power taxable at the donee's exercise of the power and not at
the donor's death. Of course, if the power is coupled with a life
estate, this means that only the life estate is taxed at the donor's
death (this being an interest not subject to the power) and that the
remainder is taxed at the donee's death to the recipients of the
property through the exercise or nonexercise of the power.
However, an element of doubt as to the construction of the Minne-
sota version of this statute was raised by In re Estate of Robinson."3
That case quite properly held that under our statute the remainders
appointed by a life tenant-donee of the power must be taxed at the
donee's death. However, the opinion is more remarkable for what it
does not say than for what it holds. It appears clearly from the state-
ment of facts in the Robinson case that the remainders as well as the
59. First Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner of Taxation, 250 Minn. 122, 84 N.W,2d
55 (1957).
60. M-N. STAT. § 291.01(l (1) (1957).
61. Or at any other lapse or exercise by the donee.
62. People v. Linn, 357 Ill. 220, 191 N.E. 450 (1934); Matter of Howe, 86 App.
Div. 286, 83 N.Y. Supp. 825 (Sup. Ct. 1903), aff'd mem., 176 N.Y. 570, 68 N.E.
1118 (1903); In re Tillinghast's Estate, 94 Misc. 76, 157 N.Y. Supp. 379 (Surr. Ct.
1916), 94 Misc. 50, 157 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sur. Ct. 1916), aff'd mem., 184 App. Div.
886, 170 N.Y. Supp. 1116 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Will of Nunnernacher, 230 Wis. 93,
283 N.W. 326 (1939); Will of Morgan, 227 Wis. 288, 277 N.W. 650 (1938),
rehearing denied, 227 Wis. 294, 278 N.W. 859 (1938). See also People v. Metro-
politan Trust Co., 369 Ill. 84, 15 N.E.2d 729 (1938); People v. Cavence, 368 I11.
391, 14 N.E.2d 232 (1938).
63. 192 Minn. 39, 255 N.W. 486 (1934).
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life interest had previously been valued and subjected to tax under
the familiar "composition agreement" procedure in the estate of the
donor of the power. Unless the statute is to be interpreted as
creating a double tax on the remainder interest subject to a power,
this earlier tax was a wholly unnecessary and improper tax. The
court's reasoning in Robinson implies that there should be no tax on
the remainders in the donor's estate. However, it does not expressly
negative the applicability of the tax at the donor's death and fails
to comment on the double tax feature. In a similar case arising in
Wisconsin, Will of Morgon, 4 the Wisconsin court took occasion
to comment specifically on the impropriety of the tax at the donor's
death.
Apparently as a consequence of the Robinson case in Minnesota,
the Commissioner continues at present to assert a tax on the property
of the donor even though the property is made subject to a power of
appointment by the donor's will or other instrument, which, except
for the power, would create a transfer taxable at the donor's death.05
This is succession theory gone wild. Ownership theory is first used
in applying common law property rules to achieve a tax at the
donor's death. At the donee's death the succession theory inherent in
the statute is then used to tax the transfer again.
It is submitted that the first tax at the donor's death is unnecessary
and improper and creates a double tax situation and that authority,
including the Robinson case (rightly read), supports levy of an
inheritance tax only at exercise or lapse in the hands of the donee."0
The principle of taxing power of appointment property in the
hands of the donee only seems clear enough. Beyond this promon-
tory, however, this writer, at least, finds himself at sea. The subdi-
vision relating to powers is a boundlessly broad statute. Taken
64. 227 Wis. 288, 277 N.W. 650, rehearing denied, 227 Wis. 294, 278 N.W. 859
(1938).
65. In practice, such tax is usually adjusted by the composition agreement proposed
by the state as in the Robinson case.
66. Unfortunately, we have as yet no absolute judicial assurance that errors of law
(as distinguished from mistakes) in the determination of inheritance tax can be
corrected via the route of application for refund and suit against the Commissioner
in District Court as provided in Mnn. STAT. § 291.32 (1957). See, however, Johnson,
Administration Procedures in the Minnesota Department of Taxation, 41 Mz,. L.
1-Ev. 435, 449 (1957). If the sole remedy for legal errors turns out to be an appeal
to the Board of Tax Appeals, under MmwN. STAT. § 271.06 (1957), those desiring
redress from a tax at the donor's death on property subject to a power will have to
move speedily after the tax order has been issued. A further question which the
taxpayer may have to answer in claiming a refund is whether he is estopped by
having voluntarily entered into a composition agreement. The taxpayer having
attained no advantage in exchange for his promise and the Department having
suffered no detriment, it hardly seems that the taxpayer is estopped. The Robinson
case itself shows that the Commissioner is not estopped by the earlier composition
agreement.
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literally, the subdivision could create many strange results in
particular cases.
For example, the statute says that whenever a power is exercised
by the donee or lapses, a transfer subject to inheritance tax occurs.
In the usual case, the donee possesses a life estate in the property
subject to the power as well as a testamentary power of appoint-
ment. In such a case, taxability under the statute is clear. T The same
is true if the donee's power is exercisable inter vivos by deed which,
however, vests the property in enjoyment only at his death. But sup-
pose the donee possesses a power which can be exercised inter vivos
to take effect at the time of exercise - is the statute literally applic-
able? Is an inheritance tax due at the exercise or lapse of the donee's
power during his lifetime?
One possible construction affecting the legal answer to these
questions is that subdivision 3 of section 291.01, relating to powers,
merely modifies subdivision 1, relating to transfers at death, thus
showing the circumstances under which powers will be deemed
transfers at death under subdivision 1. If that is correct, only exer-
cise or lapse of the power at the death of the donee or in contempla-
tion of death or as a transfer intended to take effect at or after his
death will be subject to tax. However, the provisions as to transfers
of joint tenancy property68 and of insurance, 69 both of which are
worded in the same manner as the provisions on powers, obviously
constitute bases of taxation which are independent of subdivision 1.
If the same is true of powers, an inheritance tax could become due
at the exercise of a power by the donee during his lifetime by deed
of appointment "when made." Nothing in subdivision 3 expressly
negatives this result; rather, the analogy contained in the subdivision
to bequests by will suggests that means of exercising the power
other than by will are contemplated.
If an inheritance tax is held capable of being levied on the exer-
cise or lapse of the donee's power even before his death, various
further questions arise. How would such a tax be computed, since
the further transfers subject to tax at the donee's death would not
yet be ascertained? Would it be subject to credit for any gift tax that
might result? Could such a tax be enforced as a practical matter,
since the act of exercise or lapse could occur at any time and
normally an inheritance tax return is called for only at death? Would
the limited exemption for property transferred within five years 70
be applicable where, at the most, only one decedent (the donor of
the power) was involved?
67. See cases cited notes 58 & 59 supra.
68. MINN. STAT. § 291.01(4) (1957).
69. MiNN. STAT. § 291.01(5) (1957).
70. MUN. STAT. § 291.06 (1957).
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Notwithstanding these difficulties, an inheritance tax has been
held applicable, under a statute like that in Minnesota, even to
exercise or release of a power during the donee's lifetime .7 If this
somewhat startling result is correct, further problems arise; for ex-
ample, is there also a gift tax upon such an exercise or lapse? It seems
to avoid the greatest number of difficult problems under the Minne-
sota type of statute if, where a gift tax law is in force, an inter vivos
exercise by a donee or a lapse is taxed as a gift rather than as an
inheritance.
Another instance of the difficulties encountered in applying this
statute relates to the kind of power possessed by the donee. Again
there is the familiar case of the donee possessing a life estate and a
general power; he can appoint the entire property to his estate.
Clearly, such a power should be taxed as though the donee owned
the property. Even if the life tenant has power to appoint the
property to a limited class only, it seems clear that our statute
intends a tax. But suppose the donee has no interest in the property
but only the naked power to decide who shall take it. In effect, he
acts as the donor's agent to regulate enjoyment among the donor's
beneficiaries whose way of life the donor can no longer observe after
his death. Suppose that the donee is merely a trustee and, to com-
pound the problems, suppose the donee is a corporate trustee having
a perpetual charter and a power that lasts as long as the trust. Is the
succession of the takers of the property to be taxed at the time of
receipt and on the basis of the exemptions and tax rates applicable
to strangers (a corporate trustee presumably having no relatives)?
If so, the donor is under some tax coercion to select a trustee
who is not a stranger but is related to the class of possible appointees
or takers-in-default.
In other words, is a mere trustee or other possessor of a naked
power to be regarded as the donee of a power with all the tax conse-
quences which follow under the statute? If so, does it matter
whether the power is one to select an outright distributee of the
principal or is only a power to "sprinle" income or a discretionary
power to invade principal in an emergency?- If these discretionary
powers are included powers of appointment, it would not appear to
be a defense to the tax to say that they were not used, since the lapse
of the power as well as its exercise is taxed under the statute.
Some of the more extreme of these suppositions go beyond the
line of reason. Yet where is the line to be drawn? The statute does
not suggest a line and helpful cases cannot be found in states having
71. In re Wendel's Estate, 223 N.Y. 483, 119 N.E. 879 (1918) (exercise); Westen
v. South Carolina Tax Comnn'n, 212 S.C. 530, 48 S.E.2d 504 (1948) (release). In
neither New York nor South Carolina was there a gift tax law in effect at the time
of the foregoing decisions.
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similar acts. The succession theory represented by the Minnesota
statute would seem to impose the tax upon the recipients of the
property whenever they receive it. Fortunately, the Commissioner
has declined the opportunity to insist upon the application of this
principle in the more extreme cases.72 Some interpretations, limita-
tions and safeguards would doubtless be developed by the Minne-
sota court if suitable cases presented themselves.
As a matter of principle, however, is a strict succession theory
law, even when patched with some exceptions, the most desirable
manner of taxing powers? Undoubtedly, the Minnesota type of
statute was passed in part for the purpose of simplifying the com-
putation of tax. The purpose is accomplished in part, the reason
being that the tax is deferred until the actual takers under the power
are known, thus establishing known exemptions, rates and life
expectancies.73 On the other hand, the property subject to the power
must be valued twice in any case if the donor leaves intervening
life estates, since the intervening estates should be taxed at the
donor's death, irrespective of the granting of the power. Property
subject to the power is perhaps more likely to escape tax inadver-
tently at the death of the donee than at that of the donor who owned
the property.
It is also fairer that the property be deemed transferred, following
the common law rule, on the basis of the transferee's relationship
to the donor than his relationship to the donee. This is particularly
true where the donee is simply a trustee having no interest in the
property. No doubt it may be fair that a donee possessing the right
to avail himself of the property should be regarded as the owner.
But the statute makes no distinction between donees possessing
only a power and those possessing a power coupled with an estate
or even those possessing-the right to appropriate the property at
any time.74
A statute is needed which will create better lines of demarcation
72. The Commissioner of course still assesses a tax on the property in the donor's
estate. By this means, in doubtful cases, only one tax on the power of appointment
property is encountered. It is a major thesis of this section of this Article that only
one tax is assessable on Minnesota powers in all events- that being ono at tho
donee's death under the present statute.
73. This simplification occurs, however, only if, as above urged, our statute Is
interpreted as imposing tax only at the exercise or lapse in the hands of the donee
and not at the death of the donor.
74. "When any person ... shall exercise a power of appointment . . . such
appointment when made shall be deemed a transfer taxable . . . in the same manner
as though the property to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the
donee of such power and had been bequeathed or devised by such donee by
will .. " MINN. STAT. § 291.01(3) (1957). But see In re Bradley's Estate, 241
Minn. 394, 63 N.W.2d 374 (1954), which indicates that a power to consume during
life will amount to ownership by the donee and not to a power of appointment.
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between these different types of cases. Under federal law the
troublesome problems of determining the identity of the ultimate
transferees do not exist, except where marital deduction and ap-
pointment to charity are involved. However, the federal law makes
a needed distinction between powers exercisable beneficially in
favor of the donee (general powers) and those exercisable only in a
nonbeneficial manner (special powers). Where an independent
trustee, for example, has power to "sprinkle" benefits among mem-
bers of the donor's family, there is nothing that smacks of inheritance
in the exercise or lapse of the power. A mechanism already exists
under Minnesota statutes for determining the identity and interest
of the takers under the power."
At present, knowledgable estate planners in Minnesota are often
denied the use of what elsewhere is a most valued tool This is true
both because of the troublesome unanswered questions and also
because of the administratively imposed double tax. Of course, the
familiar power of appointment as an incident of a trust intended to
qualify for marital deduction under the federal estate tax law"0 is
in wide use because usually the saving of federal estate tax thereby
effected offsets any increased inheritance tax.
The writer's experience is that other powers are used sparingly
in Minnesota. For example, giving a life interest to a child in trust
with power on his part to appoint by will among his spouse and
issue might be regarded as a good solution to the perennial problem
of providing for an as yet unmet but possibly worthy spouse of a
child. Such a solution would generally be deemed unwise in Minne-
sota because of the present administrative practice of asserting a
tax on the trust remainders both in the donor's estate and in the
donee's.
Several of the states which had statutes essentially the same as
Minnesota's have now changed or modified them in the direction of
closer conformity to .the ownership theory. Among these states are
Indiana, Illinois, New York and Wisconsin."
A new and much clearer statute on the subject of powers of
appointment should also be adopted in Minnesota. Such a statute
should return to the principles of the ownership theory in defining
taxable transfers and should possess the following features:
(1) The common law rule should be adhered to so that the prop-
erty subject to the power, like other property possessed by the donor
75. MINN. STAT. § 291.11(5) (1957).
76. ITT. REv. COD. OF 1954, § 2056.
77. See cases cited note 62 supra; Wxs. STAT. ANx. § 72.01(5) (Supp. 1958), §
72.15(8m) (1957); 4 P-H ]N. & TaAs. TAX SERv. Ind. 116. Presumably these
states would now follow the common law rule which taxes under the ownership
theory. See notes 53 & 54 supra.
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at death, would be taxed to the transferees at his death. The identity
of the ultimate transferees is unknown at the donor's death, but the
determination of the takers (and consequently of exemptions, rates
and life expectancies) can be handled as provided in section
291.11(5).78
(2) General powers of appointment should be deemed outright
transfers to the donee.
(3) Powers should not be taxed again at the death of the donee,
except general powers as to which the property should be deemed
owned by the donee and subject to inheritance tax at his death,
whether exercised or not exercised. The exercise, release or lapse of a
general power during the donee's lifetime should be deemed subject
to gift tax but not to inheritance tax unless it qualifies as a transfer
made by the donee in contemplation of death or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death.
(4) The transfer of property subject to a general power should be
regarded as eligible between donor and donee for the limited exemp-
tion for property taxed within five years.
(5) General powers of appointment should be defined as they are
in the federal tax law.79
(6) The statute should be made effective as to donors and donees
of powers dying after passage of the statute. In the case of donees,
it need not be material when the power was created, since in terms
all powers are taxable to the donees under the present law.
It does not appear that any loss of revenue will result from adop-
tion of such a statute. In fact, if it is assumed that, rightly construed,
it is present law that the power is taxed only upon exercise or lapse
in the donee's hands, the possibility of double taxation (on general
powers) will be enhanced and the time of assessment of the tax will
be advanced to the donor's death. At the same time much certainty
and fairness will be gained, together with the maximum practicable
conformity with federal law. A prime tool of the estate planner will
be restored to usefulness in Minnesota.
III. INHERITANCE TAX ON TRANSFERs TAxINc EFFECT AT DEATH
Almost without exception, the death tax laws of the United States
and of the various states impose a tax in some form on transfers
made by a decedent "intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after [his] death."80 Minnesota's inheritance tax on trans-
78. This in effect would reverse the Robinson case which had held that the
"highest rate" statute herein referred to was not applicable to powers.
79. INr. REv. CoDE: oF 1954, § 2041. Only the post-1942 part of the definition of
powers need be used.
80. MniN. STAT. § 291.41(4) (1957). The writer believes that among states
having death taxes, only Louisiana has no provision for such a tax. Nevada has no
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fers taking effect at death, often called "transfers intended,"8' like
other Minnesota inheritance tax provisions noted, has been inter-
preted in accordance with extreme succession theory in favor of
taxability.
Transfers made during the transferor's lifetime, but taking effect
at death, were first subjected to tax in Pennsylvania as early as
1826.2 The purpose of the various federal and state statutes on this
subject undoubtedly was to prevent an obvious means of circum-
venting the death tax laws. 3 If all transfers made before death
escaped the death tax, the wily transferor could avoid the tax by
such means as creating living trusts, and still remain the life bene-
ficiary or retain the right of final disposition or of revocation of the
trust. The statutes were designed to prevent him from having his
cake (enjoying the property during life or reserving the right to
dispose of it at death) and eating it too (avoiding the death tax).
Since the adoption of gift tax laws by the federal government and
by many states, this basic objective might well be thought less
important than it originally was, at least as to lifetime transfers
which wholly or substantially come within the terms of the gift tax
law. However, transfers effective at death continue to be taxed,
though perhaps in some instances under more moderate statutes
than previously.84
Due principally to the preponderance of inheritance tax (as dis-
tinguished from estate tax) laws in the states and the undoubted
differences between such laws and estate tax laws, the states, in this
field at least, have taken the lead from the federal government in
widening the areas of taxability. For example, in Minnesota and
many other states, an inter vivos transfer with reserved life estate
death tax. Other states, such as Florida and Georgia, impose only a "pick-up tax"
designed to utilize the credit offered under the federal estate tax law for state death
taxes. FiA. STAT. ANx. § 198.02 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3401 (1935). The
credit against federal estate taxes is provided for in INT. REv. CoDe oF 1954, § 2011.
The imposition of the federal tax on transfers with a reserved life estate, transfers
taking effect at death, and revocable transfers is in INT. REv. CODE O 1954, §§
2086-38.
81. See MmN. STAT. § 291.01(1)(3) (1957).
82. See Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 637 (1949).
83. See Estate of Madison, 26 Cal. 2d 453, 159 P.2d 630 (1945); In re Estate of
Rising, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N.W. 459 (1932); Reish v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 521
(1884).
84. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 constituted some relaxation of prior rules
affecting persons dying subsequent to October 7, 1949, and prior to August 17, 1954,
in this field. Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1989, § 811(c) (3) with INr. Rzv. CODE OF
1954, § 2087. Some states have also recently passed statutes which arc less stringent.
In New Jersey, for example, the judicial construction strongly favoring taxability in
all situations where the interest shifted at the transferor's death was modified in
1955 by the limitation that if the transferor had divested himself of all rights or
interests in the property within three years prior to his death, the transfer will
escape tax. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:34-1.1 (Supp. 1957).
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was deemed a transfer effective at death and taxable,8" while in
the federal field, May v. Heiner,8" which reached the opposite
result, remained good law. At least since Commissioner v. Estate of
Church,7 there seems to be almost universal agreement among both
the states and the federal government that transfers with reserved
life estate are intended to take effect at death. While there are few
state cases relating specifically to transfers with reversionary rights
retained, it seems reasonable that such cases would follow the result
in the retained life estate cases.88 If a beneficial power of revocation
or amendment or other power of disposition over the lifetime trans-
fer is reserved by the transferor, the transferred property is also
generally agreed to be subject to tax at the transferor's death."' In
all of the foregoing types of cases, possession and enjoyment in some
measure may return to the transferor up to the time of his death,
thus rendering the transfer in effect ambulatory during life. Hence,
such transfers may be called "substitutes for wills." 0 0 In the case of
such transfers, there seems to be no reason for substantial disagree-
ment between state and federal rules irrespective of the type of
death tax law in effect.
There remain two important types of transfers taking effect at
death in which markedly different results are often obtained under
the federal estate tax law and state inheritance tax law. One of
these concerns the taxation of annuities and employee death bene-
fits. These are dealt with in section IV of this Article. The other, to
be discussed here, involves transfers (or perhaps more accurately,
shifts or changes in interests) taking effect at the transferor's death
where the transferor, during his lifetime, has parted with all rights
of enjoyment, of reversion, of revocation or otherwise. Such transfers
(if not in contemplation of death) would clearly escape federal tax.
They are not ambulatory until the decedent's death, since all rights
in or to affect possession and enjoyment of the property have been
renounced by the transferor long before death. Under the ownership
theory of inheritance taxation, these transfers would escape tax. It is
in this type of case that Minnesota again has a far-reaching succes-
sion theory decision, holding property so given inter vivos taxable at
the donor's death.
85. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U.S. 509 (1933), affirming 114 Conn.
207, 158 At. 245 (1932); In re Estate of Rising, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N.W. 459
(1932).
86. 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
87. 835 U.S. 632 (1949).
88. This result was securely settled for federal purposes in Estate of Spiegel v.
Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
89. See Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916). If the reserved power does
not amount to power to revest the property in the donor or substantially to control
its enjoyment, the result perhaps should be otherwise. See Will of Prango, 201 Wis.
636, 231 N.W. 271 (1930).
90. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 835 U.S. 632, 646 (1949).
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In Chase v. Commissioner of Taxation,"" the decedent donor,
twelve years prior to her death, had created irrevocable trusts for the
primary benefits of each of five children. In each trust the beneficiary
was to receive income for the life of the donor and then was to re-
ceive distribution of the principal. In the event of death (prior to the
donor's death) of one of the children with issue surviving, the
income was to shift and be paid thereafter to the issue of the
deceased child per stirpes. In the event of the death of a child
without issue surviving prior to the death of the donor, apparently
the trust assets were to be distributed in accordance with the exer-
cise of a general power of appointment conferred on the deceased
child, or in default of the exercise of such a power, were to be
divided equally among the trusts for the remaining of the donor's
children." In fact, the donor was survived by all of her children.
Upon the donor's death, an inheritance tax on the full amount of the
principal distributive share of each child was assessed by the Com-
missioner. Upon review of this assessment, the Board of Tax Appeals
(following ownership theory) determined that no inheritance tax
was due because the donor had divested herself of all interest in
income or principal of the trust by a transfer antedating the Minne-
sota gift tax law and not made in contemplation of death. Upon
certiorari, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the Board's deci-
sion. The court, in reaching this result, acknowledged that in the
prior Minnesota case where a tax was imposed under this section, 3
the donor had retained a life interest. The court reviewed other
authorities holding that where the ultimate beneficiary received
"final and complete title" at the donor's death as a result of an earlier
transfer by the donor, a "transfer intended to take effect in posses-
sion or enjoyment" at the donor's death had occurred. The court
distinguished the federal cases where the question of taxability
turned on the donor's possession of taxable incidents at death rather
than upon the realization of the transferees interest. Under the dicta
of the earlier Minnesota decision in In re Estate of Rising,94 the
court felt that it was committed to the theory that a transfer taking
effect at death has occurred "when the ultimate complete possession
and enjoyment and the final vesting of title of the principal in the
beneficiaries is made contingent upon, or takes effect at or after, the
death of the donor." 5 In re Estate of Marshall9" was distinguished.
91. 226 Minn. 521, 83 N.W.2d 706 (1948).
92. In the case of a daughter, Anna, who, it may be conjectured, had no issue,
there were no provisions for continuing the trust for her issue at her death, but
otherwise the same plan of distribution obtained.
93. In re Estate of Rising, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N.W. 459 (1932).
94. Ibd.
95. Chase v. Commissioner of Taxation, 226 Minn. 521, 532, 33 NAV.2d 706,
712 (1948).
96. 179 Minn. 233, 228 N.W. 920 (1930).
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A few states have succession theory decisions in accord with the
Chase decision. New Jersey, California and Texas are clearly in
accord,97 although New Jersey, by recent statute, has permitted the
grantor to dispose of his rights and escape tax. 8 Connecticut appar-
ently is in accord; 9 New York has conflicting cases; 00 Massachu-
setts apparently supports the succession theory as applied to this
type of transfer.1 1
An approximately equal number of jurisdictions have ownership
theory decisions rejecting the tax if the decedent retained no inter-
ests in the subject matter of the transfer at death. Illinois,'0 " Ohio,10
Pennsylvania,0 4 and Delaware' 5 are clear ownership theory states.
Michigan, 10 6 Washington, 1' and Wisconsin 08 all seem inclined to-
ward ownership theory. New York, as noted, has decisions both
ways.10 9
Which line of cases constitutes the more reasonable interpreta-
tion of the "transfer intended" section of an inheritance tax law?
97. Estate of Madison, 26 Cal. 2d 453, 159 P.2d 630 (1945); In ra Estate of
Hollander, 123 N.J. Eq. 52, 195 AtI. 805 (Prer. 1938); In re Estate of Hartford, 122
N.J. Eq. 489, 194 At. 800 (Prer. 1937), aff'd sub nor. Hartford v. Martin, 122
N.J.L. 283, 4 A.2d 31 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939); Bethea v. Sheppard, 143 S.W.2d 997
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
98. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:34-1.1 (Supp. 1957).
99. Fabian v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 456, 58 A.2d 384 (1948); Bridgeport-City Trust
Co. v. McLaughlin, 9 Conn. Supp. 196 (Super. Ct. 1941); see also Bryant v. Hackett,
118 Conn. 233, 171 AUt. 664 (1934). But see Connelly, v. Waterbury Nat'l Bank, 130
Conn. 503, 72 A.2d 645 (1950).
100. See, e.g., In re Schweinert's Estate, 133 Misc. 762, 234 N.Y. Supp. 807 (Surr.
Ct. 1929); In re Kirby's Estate, 133 Misc. 152, 231 N.Y. Supp. 408 (Surr. Ct. 1928),
aff'd mem., 228 App. Div. 640, 237 N.Y. Supp. 812 (1929), motion for leave to
appeal denied, 228 App. Div. 171, 239 N.Y. Supp. 390 (1930), afJ'd more., 254 N.Y.
624, 173 N.E. 894 (1930); In re Patterson's Estate, 127 N.Y. Supp. 284 (Sur. Ct.
1910), aff'd, 146 App. Div. 286, 130 N.Y. Supp. 970 (1911), aJ'd mer., 204 N.Y.
677, 98 N.E. 1109 (1912); In re Cruger, 54 App. Div. 405, 66 N.Y. Supp. 636
(1900), aff'd mem., 166 N.Y. 602, 59 N.E. 1121 (1901).
101. State St. Trust Co. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 209 Mass. 373, 95 N.E. 851
(1911); see also Coolidge v. Commissioner, 268 Mass. 443, 167 N.E. 757 (1929),
rev'd sub nom. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931) (retrospective application
held unconstitutional).
102. People v. Northern Trust Co., 330 Ill. 288, 161 N.E. 525 (1928); People v.
Kelley, 218 Il. 509, 75 N.E. 1038 (1905); see People v. McCormick, 327 Ill. 547,
158 N.E. 861 (1927).
103. In re Heine's Estate, 100 N.E.2d 545 (Ohio P. Ct. 1950); In re Estate of
Hazelton, 148 Ohio St. 127, 73 N.E.2d 799 (1947).
104. Glosser Trust, 355 Pa. 210, 49 A.2d 401 (1946); Townsend Trust, 349 Pa.
162, 36 A.2d 438 (1944); Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924).
105. Highfield v. Equitable Trust Co., 84 Del. 509, 155 At. 724 (Super. Ct. 1931).
106. State v. Welch's Estate, 285 Mich. 555, 209 N.W. 930 (1926); cf. In ra
Rackham's Estate, 829 Mich. 493, 45 N.W.2d 273 (1951).
107. In re Estate of Molke, 198 Wash. 6, 86 P.2d 763 (1939); In re Estate of
Sheard, 181 Wash. 62, 42 P.2d 34 (1935).
108. Will of Prange, 201 Wis. 636, 231 N.W. 271 (1930).
109. Cases cited note 100 supra.
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Both types of decision in most fact situations are logically sound
applications of their particular premises and therefore are satisfying
in a legalistic sense. Perhaps an answer to the question of the pro-
priety of the rules can most closely be approached through an
analysis of the premises 'on which the succession and ownership
theories depend in this type of transfer.
Under both theories it seems necessary to acknowledge that mere
rules of property law do not govern the incidence of tax in this
sphere. Stated more particularly, the fact that all property interests
vest at the time of the original inter vivos transfer by the donor will
not of itself prevent the tax at his later death.110 A distinction has
to be made between vesting in the property law sense and coming
into possession and enjoyment as required by the statutes."1 If this
were not so, even transfers with reserved life estate would escape
taxation at the transferors death.
This practical test, which looks for a shift of possession or enjoy-
ment of the interest to the ultimate recipient at the transferor's
death, is certainly a first step on the road to succession theory. How-
ever, the extreme succession theory cases such as Chase seem to go
back to property law to borrow the next step by which taxation is
achieved. Suppose A irrevocably conveys property "to B for the life
of A, remainder to C." Agreed, at A's death, C realizes possession
and enjoyment. But apart from property rules, upon the practical
tax theory of shifting of enjoyment it appears that C obtains his
enjoyment from and as successor of B. It is only a property law
concept that makes A, who had divested himself of the enjoyment
years before, the transferor. Employing this concept, however (and
apparently ignoring the requirement that a transfer be from a trans-
feror), the cases under discussion have held this transmission of
property a taxable transfer from A. Perhaps this is why the Minne-
sota court has hinted that our inheritance tax statute taxes both
transmission and succession."12 Neither pure ownership theory nor
pure succession theory alone seems logically capable of producing
110. But see In re Estate of Marshall, 179 Minn. 233, 228 N.W. 920 (1930).
111. Three different senses in which the term "vest" can be used in connection
with the taxation of transfers are illustrated by the opinions in Coolidge v. Commis-
sioner, 268 Mass. 443, 167 N.E. 757 (1929), rev'd sub nom. Coolidge v. Long, 282
U.S. 582 (1931) (retrospective application held unconstitutional). For example, as
pointed out by the dissent in Coolidge v. Long, a distinction is made in inheritance
tax statutes between vesting in the property sense (at the time of transfer and
subject to divestiture) and vesting in possession and enjoyment (gossibly at the time
of the transferor's death). 282 U.S. at 608. For purposes of the contract" and "due
process" clauses, the majority of the Court held that vesting occurred at tho date of
the initial transfer. The dissent argued that the time of vesting for constitutional
purposes was the time of occurrence of the event taxed - that is, the subsequent
death of the transferor.
112. See text discussion at note 6 supra and cases cited.
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taxability in this hypothetical situation -borrowing from the con-
cepts of both to make a logical mrlange is necessary to secure this
result." 3
Viewed from a practical standpoint, the rule of the Chase and
similar cases also seems unduly to emphasize form rather than sub-
stance. Suppose again that A transfers inter vivos "to B for the life
of A, remainder to C." Assume A's life expectancy is five years. Can-
not A accomplish this objective and avoid the tax by transferring to
B for five years, remainder to C? Or suppose that A conditions his
transfer on the life of some person other than himself? Again the
tax is avoided.
Moreover, the rule of these cases apparently leads to possible
double taxation of the same transfer. In the situation of A "to B for
the life of A, remainder to C," there is an immediate inter vivos gift
of the whole property in two portions, that to B being measured by
A's life expectancy, and that to C accounting for the balance of the
value of the property. Both transfers are fully subject to gift tax.' 4
Upon A's later death, these cases say that the full value of the prop-
erty is again deemed transferred, this time all to C. There is,
therefore, a full inheritance tax on the same transfer. Again, property
rules are used to effect the gift tax and are abandoned in part to
secure the inheritance tax.
Of course, a credit against the inheritance tax is given for gift
taxes paid."' Under the statute allowing this credit, a question of
interpretation may arise whether any credit would be allowed on the
gift tax paid on the transfer of the income interest for the life of A,
since the subject of this gift would already have been consumed at
A's death. (In all events, the credit avails little if values of the
property have appreciated between the gift and death.)
By contrast, look again at A to C reserving a life estate to A, or
look at A to C in trust reserving a right of revocation by A. In these
admittedly stronger inheritance tax situations there is universal
agreement that an inheritance tax should be paid. A, after all, has
"had his cake." Yet here A is spared from paying gift tax on the
value of his reserved life interest or right of revocation,"" and there-
fore, from having to try to prove his entitlement to the credit on the
tax represented by this portion of the gift. It seems likely that less
total tax (gift tax plus inheritance tax) will be incurred with respect
to these transfers than in the more doubtful Chase situation.
113. By contrast, under both theories a tax is properly imposed where A transfers
to C reserving a life estate in himself. Under ownership theory A possesses and
transmits all rights of enjoyment to C at his death. Under succession theory C suc-
ceeds to all rights from A, his immediate predecessor in possession.
114. MiNN. STAT. §§ 292.01(1), (3) (1957).
115. MINN. STAT. § 292.14 (1957).
116. MINN. STAT. § 292.01(4) (1957).
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The Chase case was the logical extension of a succession theory
doctrine stated in Rising, but unnecessary to the decision of that
case. The actual facts of Chase showed a much less definite shift of
interest than those of the hypothetical cases discussed. In Chase
there was no shift of possession and enjoyment from B to C on A's
death. There the actual facts were: "A to B (income) for the life of
A, remainder (principal) to B." The transfer taxed consisted only of
a change in the form of B's possession and enjoyment at A's death
from an income interest to a principal interest. Inheritance taxation
of an inter vivos transfer, fully subject to gift tax, of property in
which the transferor retains no beneficial rights and retains only so
tenuous a connection as a shift in the nature of the interest of the
transferees at his death seems to be straining the principles of a
death tax. It is to be hoped that the less extreme succession theory
expressed in In re Estate of Marshall 1 7 and hinted at in the Blue
Diamond "I case will be followed in future cases of transfers taking
effect at death. Here again, however, awaiting new case law will not
be a sure or speedy solution.
Any statutory re-emphasis of ownership theory, of course, should
continue to recognize the basic principle that an inter vivos trans-
feror cannot both keep control of the property or arrange to have
it return to him and still avoid tax on the passage of the property to
another at his death. In such cases, the transfer is truly a substitute
for a will. But, for the reasons noted, if the transferor has parted
with all rights of enjoyment, control or reversion, it should be recog-
nized that a gift tax, and only a gift tax, is due on the original
transfer, notwithstanding that some change occurs at the transferor's
death in the nature, possession or enjoyment of the interest of the
transferees.
This result can best be achieved if the various types of taxable
situations usually thought to be embraced in the phrase "transfer
intended to take effect at or after death" are separately enumerated
in the statute. This is the method now used in the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. Thus transfers with retained life estate "9 and revoc-
able transfers 2 0 are each included in a separate section. With few
exceptions, the words of these federal statutes could be effectively
used in Minnesota.12'
117. 179 Minn. 233, 228 N.W. 920 (1930).
118. 91 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1958).
119. INr. REv. CoD E O 1954, § 2036.
120. Ihr. REv. CODE op 1954, § 2038.
121. The new statutes of course would have to refer to "a taxable transfer"
existing under the conditions stated therein instead of referring to the value of the
property transferred being included in the "gross estate." Also, the new statute
should be made to apply only to transfers mrde by decedent dying after the effective
date of such new statute.
1959] 471
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In the case of transfers effective only through survival of the
decedent, the federal section 122 imposes a tax only where the trans-
feror retains a reversionary interest exceeding five per cent of the
value of the property transferred. Adoption of this provision in
Minnesota would introduce a rule of greater reasonableness into the
type of tax situation presented by the Chase case.
123
The advantages of uniformity with federal law which have previ-
ously been remarked on in the case of other types of transfer, such
as greater certainty and fairness than now is the case, immediate
availability of more complete precedents and interpretations, and
greater comprehensibility by laymen and practitioners alike, are all
at least equally applicable to new legislation in the field of transfers
taking effect at death.
IV. INHERITANCE TAx ON ANNurIEs AND EMPLOYEE DEATti BENEFITS
A type of property transferable at death which has growing
economic importance today is the employee's retirement annuity,
pension or profit sharing plan. A related, more conventional type of
property-the ordinary annuity contract-may also have increas-
ing future importance under new impetus from two sources. These
sources are proposed legislation granting income tax deferment to
privately purchased retirement plans of professional and other self-
employed persons 12 4 and proposals to authorize issuance of so-called
"variable annuities." 125
With increased emphasis on these types of property has come
increased tax attention. The federal estate tax law since 1954 con-
tains a section 2 devoted exclusively to these subjects. Recent
changes, both state and federal, have been made in income tax laws
relating to annuities and death benefits. 127 It is appropriate to exam-
ine the status of these types of property under Minnesota inheritance
tax law.
The Minnesota inheritance tax statute contains no provision ex-
pressly dealing with these topics. It is clear, however, that annuities
purchased and owned by the decedent in which the unused balance
at the decedent's death passes to beneficiaries named by him are
subject to Minnesota inheritance tax. In State ex rel. Thornton v.
Probate Court,'28 three annuity contracts were purchased by the
122. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2037.
123. Again, some minor adjustments to suit the language to a transfer tax and to
limit the applicability of the statute to future decedents would be needed.
124. The Jenkins-Keogh bill recently failed of enaction, but it promises to bo a
perennial until passage finally occurs.
125. The friends of such annuities apparently are continuing efforts to clear the
obstacles under present legal provisions. See Note, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1115, 1110 n.8
(1958).
126. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039.
127. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-04; MINN. STAT. § 290.26 (1957).
128. 186 Minn. 351, 243 N.W. 389 (1932).
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decedent. Upon his death, shortly after the purchase, the single
premium paid for each contract, with a slight increase, was paid to
the beneficiaries designated by the decedent. The estate representa-
tives argued that the benefits were insurance -insurance at the
time not being expressly subject to inheritance tax. The court held
that the benefits were not insurance (which it assumed, without
deciding, was not taxable) and held them to be taxable. The court
failed to state the specific clause in the statute under which the tax
was imposed but found the benefits "an estate or property right of
.. . [the decedent] to which the beneficiaries named succeeded at
his death." These were not probate assets and there was no discus-
sion in the opinion of a transfer in contemplation of death. Accord-
ingly, the benefits must have been taxed on the theory of a power
of appointment or, more probably, as a transfer taking effect at
death. The exact language employed by the court suggests owner-
ship theory.
In Stewart's Estate, a Board of Tax Appeals case, -12 1 the taxation
of an annuity was rested more explicitly on the theory of a transfer
taking effect at death. The beneficiary here was taxed on only one-
half the value of the transfer because she had furnished one-half the
original cost.
The law of most other states having comparable statutes likewise
taxes ordinary annuities purchased by the decedent and paid to his
beneficiaries at his death as transfers taking effect at death.130 This
result appears valid under either ownership theory or succession
theory where the annuity was procured by the decedent. Normally
the decedent has a property interest in such annuity contracts which
he transfers in one form or another to the beneficiary. He also shifts
enjoyment of the death benefit to his transferee at his death so that
a transfer cognizable under succession theory takes place.'
What results should follow in the case of a death benefit under a
pension, profit sharing or retirement annuity plan? To the extent
that the benefits are paid for by the decedent under a contract
existing during his life, it does not appear that there is any important
distinction between such death benefits and an ordinary annuity. "'
129. Minn. B.T.A., Docket No. 125 (March 7, 1944).
130. Day v. Walsh, 132 Conn. 5, 42 A.2d 366 (1945); Gregg v. Commissioner,
315 Mass. 704,54 N.E.2d 169 (1944); Bank of New York v. Kelly, 135 N.J. Eq. 418,
38 A.2d 899 (1944); In re Atkin' Estate, 129 N.J. Eq. 186, 18 A.2d 45 (1941),
aff'd, 127 N.J.L. 468, 23 A.2d 284 (1942), aff'd, 129 N.J.L. 127, 28 A.2d 174 (1942),
aff'd, 319 U.S. 94 (1942) (under various names); In re Bayer's Estate, 345 Pa. 308,
26 A.2d 202 (1942), cf. Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So. 2d 859 (1945).
But see In re Sweet's Estate, 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W.2d 645 (1955).
131. See Chase v. Commissioner, 226 Minn. 521, 33 N.W.2d 271 (1948).
132. But see In re Sweets Estate, 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W.2d 645 (1955) (holding
an employee-contributed annuity nontaxable under an historical construction of the
Wisconsin statute).
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To the extent that benefits are employer-contributed, however, some
obstacles to taxability are immediately raised.
In considering the susceptibility of an employer-contributed death
benefit to inheritance tax, an analysis of the particular benefit must
first be made. The possibilities run the gamut from a pure gratuity
(such as a noncontractual salary continuation payment) at one ex-
treme, to a deposit type of arrangement (such as a profit sharing
trust) in which the employee has a full measure of indefeasible
rights during his lifetime at the other extreme. Due to the paucity
of case authority in this field, the probable results in different species
of cases can only be sketched in roughly.
The salary continuation and other after-death gratuity cases may
present some tenacious income tax problems, 13 3 but they seem to
offer little difficulty under the inheritance tax law. In such cases
there is receipt of property by a transferee at the decedent's death,
but other essential elements of a taxable transfer are missing: there
was no property interest in the decedent and no transfer from him.
It is obvious that this lack is fatal under ownership theory. On
examination it also appears to be fatal under succession theory. Even
in the Chase case,"3 4 which perhaps represents the high water mark
of succession theory, the shift of benefits was taxed at the decedent's
death only because during his lifetime he had owned and transferred
the property. No cases have been found which indicate any depart-
ure from this analysis." 5
At the opposite pole are cases where a nonforfeitable fund,
account or share created by the employer under a profit-sharing
trust or retirement plan based upon contract or custom between the
employer and employee was segregated for the employee during
his lifetime and was subject to withdrawal or other lifetime use by
him. When such a separate fund account or share passes to the
beneficiaries designated by the employee, it appears clear that a
taxable transfer takes place. There is ample property interest trans-
ferred from the decedent to sustain such a holding even in jurisdic-
tions which are committed to the ownership theory in the general
case of transfers effective at death. Such was the result in Pennsyl-
vania, an ownership theory state,"36 in In re Dorsey's Estate. 1 7 In
133. See Simpson v. United States, 7th Cir., November 7, 1958 which, although
distinguishable in some respects from cases involving pure gratuities, appears to to
at odds with a long line of tax court decisions under the 1939 Code and with the
Treasury's own view as now expressed in Rev. Rul. 58-613, 1958 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 51, in holding the death benefit subject to income tax.
134. Cited note 131 supra.
135. See Borchard v. Connelly, 140 Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953) (indicating
.the necessity of some degree of ownership on the part of the employee).
136. See note 104 supra.
137. 366 Pa. 557, 79 A.2d 259 (1951).
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that case the employer's contributions to the fund amounted almost
to a deposit, the court concluding that the decedents share therein
was "bis own property." Other cases where the employee bad a
vested or nonforfeitable right in a share of a profit sharing trust have
reached a similar result.138
Between cases involving gratuities and those involving deposits
lie many variant fact situations. Where the employee acquires no
indefeasible or nonforfeitable rights in the plan prior to his death,
the element of property necessary to support a transfer is still very
weak. Under both ownership and succession theories it seems likely
that the nontaxability believed to be inherent in the gratuity cases
will carry over.
In fact, in an ownership theory jurisdiction, even where the bene-
fits have ripened during the employee's lifetime to furnish him a
retirement income, the remaining guaranteed installments have
passed tax-free at the employee's death to his beneficiary.139 Appar-
ently, under these cases lifetime powers to appropriate or withdraw
the funds are necessary to render the benefits sufficiently nonfor-
feitable to amount to ownership.
In succession theory jurisdictions, less seems to be required to
establish the nonforfeitability needed for a taxable transfer. In one
case,1 0 where the employee under an insured plan died prior to
retirement, the transfer of a death benefit to the beneficiary was held
taxable. In this case the decedent had no immediate lifetime rights
in any funds and would have lost his ultimate rights in the
event of loss of employment; yet vesting and no orfeitability
were found in the employer's surrender of its rights to return of its
contributions."'
The cases taxing employee death benefits mainly seem to proceed
on the theory of a transfer taking effect at death. In In re Dorsey's
Estate,'2 the argument that the employee possessed merely a power
of appointment over the fund (powers being exempted from the
tax) failed because it was held that the employee's interests
amounted not merely to a power but to ownership of property.
Inherent difficulties of interpretation in the common form of power
138. In re Brackett's Estate, 342 Mich. 195, 69 N.W.2d 164 (1955) (an owner-
ship theory case); In re Daniel's Estate, 93 Ohio App. 123, 112 N.E.2d 56 (1952),
aff'd, 159 Ohio St. 109, 111 N.E.2d 252 (1953) (which talks in part the language
of succession theory).
139. Enbody Estate, 85 Pa. D. & C. 49 (Orphans' CL) and Burke Estate, 85 Pa.
D. & C. 56 (Orphans' Ct.), exceptions dismissed, 85 Pa. D. & C. 65 (Orphans' Ct
1953).
140. Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 497, 103 A.2d 153 (1954).
141. New Jersey prior to the present 1955 statute was a very strong succession
theory state. See note 84 supra.
142. Cited note 137 supra.
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of appointment statutes 143 may continue to prevent a widespread
application of the powers statutes to annuities, at least where "trans-
fer intended" statutes can be used.
While we have no Minnesota cases on employee death benefits,
some indication of the probable rules can be found in the cases of
other states herein discussed and perhaps, to a degree, in the
Thornton and Chase cases. However, it is the writer's understanding
that the general administrative practice of the Department of Taxa-
tion is to treat as taxable all death benefits other than out-and-out
gratuities.
The present Minnesota case law respecting ordinary annuities
seems satisfactory. However, the law concerning employee death
benefits is far from clear and apparently is subject to variable results,
depending on delicate shades of fact in particular cases.
The new federal estate tax law covering annuities and employee
death benefits 1'4 has some distinct advantages over state inheritance
tax law developed under "transfer intended" statutes. First, it is
definite, certain and workable. In general it subjects to tax all
annuities or other death benefits growing out of contract. However,
as an exception to the general rule, benefits paid to a beneficiary
other than the decedents estate, under a qualified employees' trust
or retirement plan are exempt from the federal estate tax to the
extent of the employer's contribution. Second, contrary to present
state law, which most surely taxes the death benefits under those
plans which give the employee the maximum in nonforfeitable
rights, it offers tax protection and encouragement to the establish-
ment of only those retirement plans which are regulated under fed-
eral (and state) law in a manner best designed to safeguard the
rights of employees.14 It seems that in adopting the tax benefits
conferred by federal legislation in this field the state should not
make an exception of death tax advantages. Third, in denying tax
shelter to qualified death benefits paid to the executor of the dece-
dent's estate, it makes a healthy distinction (similar to that between
general and special powers of appointment) between what amounts
to beneficial ownership of the benefits and the mere power to direct
the enjoyment of the benefits by others.
Adoption of a state statute similar to the new federal law 10 will
143. See the discussion of construction problems under the Minnesota statute
contained in section II of this article, supra.
144. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039.
145. Congress in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-04 and the state legislature
MiNN. STAT. § 290.26 (1957) have offered the tax advantages of qualifled
trusts only to plans which are nondiscriminatory in favor of supervisory personnel,
which are of widespread application to employees and which create nonforfeitablo
rights on the part of the employees generally,
146. The state statute should make the change from the concept of inclusion in
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clarify Minnesota law respecting employee death benefits and will
encourage salutary policies toward employees through fair inheri-
tance taxation of such benefits. Another area of conflict between
federal and state tax laws, with the delays and annoyances that
almost invariably follow from such a conflict, will disappear.
V. CONCLUSION
Four distinct types of transfer at death have been discussed. In
each of them, different lines of state cases can be found falling into
two main groups- ownership theory cases and succession theory
cases. Minnesota decisions and tax practices, with some indication
of possible future relaxation, have tended to be in the vanguard of
the succession theory group.
Succession theory decisions and practices, even when they grow
logically out of their premises and precedents (and several instances
have been pointed out), necessarily create conflicts with federal
estate tax rules and practices affecting the same transfers. Such
conflicts are costly in terms of time, legal fees and public regard for
law and tax administration.
When state inheritance tax rules or practices fail to proceed
logically from their premises, or levy unfair taxes or are unformu-
lated or unclear (and it has been argued that each of these conditions
has been observed in connection with one or more of the transfers
discussed), there is still less justification for maintaining such rules
or practices in force. Hence, the thesis has been offered that imme-
diate enactment, preferably at the 1959 session of the Minnesota
Legislature, of ownership theory legislation which is as consistent
as is feasible with corresponding federal estate tax rules will work
no havoc with basic Minnesota tax theory or revenues. Adoption of
such measures will, however, abolish the more frequently en-
countered conflicts between federal and state death tax law, simplify
and speed the determination of state taxes, and promote greater
logic or fairness in the rules governing the inheritance tax transfers
considered.
the gross estate to that of a taxable transfer, should eliminate the date for determining
the existence of a contract under which the death benefit exists, and should make
certain changes in the internal references to statutory sections defining qualified
plans.
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